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Introduction  
It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental 
causation, which rests on supervenience, is such an 
attractive theory. On one side it secures the mental a 
preservation of its unique and different nature; on the other 
side it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is 
compatible with the physicalistic view.  
But Kim's argument from supervenience reminds us that 
while trying to do so the antireductionists face the following 
dilemma: if mental properties have causal powers we risk 
a violation of the causal closure of the physics and 
threaten our physicalistic position; if they do not have them 
we adopt epiphenomenalism, which denies the mental 
causal powers of any sort. So, either we violate the causal 
closure of the physics or we adopt epiphenomenalism. We 
can write it as an argument in the form of a constructive 
dilemma and may call it the causal dilemma:  
(1)  Either mental properties have causal powers or  
  they do not.  
(2)  If they have them we violate the causal closure  
  of the physics. 
(3)  If they do not have them we adopt  
  epiphenomenalism. 
∴ (4)  Either we violate the causal closure of the  
  physics or adopt epiphenomenalism.  
It is clear that for the anitreductionists who want to pre-
serve physical monism and mental realism none of the 
horns represents a true alternative and that the causal 
dilemma should be avoided at all costs.  
The first part of this article describes Horgan’s antire-
ductionist answer to the causal dilemma, the view that he 
calls causal compatibilism, which is supposed to save 
mental causation. The second part introduces my objec-
tion to Horgan’s solution based on Kim’s distinction 
between micro-properties and micro-based properties 
showing that causal compatibilism leads any antireduc-
tionist to unbearable consequences, which leaves the 
causal dilemma unsolved. 
1. Horgan's Answer to the Causal Dilemma 
Horgan’s answer to the causal dilemma consists of three 
ideas that together represent a non-reductivist solution of 
mental causation. Let’s explain the first one by the help of 
the following: suppose that my desire for water (event a1) 
causes the drinking of it (event b1). Such a causal expla-
nation emphasises the dependence of the effect b1, 
described as a token of type b events, on a cause a1, 
described as a token of type a events. Usually such a 
dependence requires for a1 and b1 to be a part of a 
counterfactual dependence, that directly connects a types 
(desires for water) with b types (drinking of water) in the 
sense that if a appears b appears also and if a does not 
appear b does not appear either, which could be symbol-
ised as a → b and ¬a → ¬b. But in Horgan’s opinion 
this is not enough for a causal explanation. He thinks that 
a similar but much more general counterfactual depend-
ence connecting desires and drinking (or beliefs and 
drinking, or intentions and drinking, or sensations and 
drinking, in short, whole groups of mental phenomena and 
actions) must exist, and he calls it a pattern of counterfac-
tual dependence. His first idea is then the claim that we 
must, when analysing the causal relevance of properties, 
take into account also their capacity for being part of such 
counterfactual relations.  
The second idea constituting his picture of mental cau-
sation is hidden in the following passage: “Which kinds of 
dependence patterns are most typical will be a context-
relative matter, governed largely by the interests of those 
doing the explaining and inquiring.” (Horgan 2001) One 
crucial feature of context which must be taken into ac-
count, when ascribing the causal efficacy to properties is 
that it involves factors and standards. The former deter-
mines the latter in the sense that, for example, to say when 
it is cold outside depends on being Slovene or Eskimo. 
The choice of vocabulary with which we want to describe a 
causal chain is one of the factors affecting a change of a 
context. Horgan calls them context parameters and thinks 
that they have a crucial role in event causation because 
they determine at which level of causal explanations we 
are and what properties we mention as causes. He says: 
“If we pose our questions and offer our answers in psy-
chological vocabulary, for instance, then normally the 
relevant patterns of counterfactual dependence will be 
ones involving psychological properties /…/.” (Horgan 
2001) His second idea is then the claim that the notion of 
causation depends on parameters; by changing them we 
change the context; and by changing the context we 
change a type of causal explanation 
Horgan’s third idea composing his solution of the causal 
dilemma is based on the belief that there are different 
patterns of counterfactual dependence describing the 
causal activity of the same phenomenon in different 
vocabularies. The vocabulary that we choose simply 
depends on the ontological level at which we are and on 
the needs that it has. A physical effect, drinking for exam-
ple, could be explained in neurophysiological terms as a 
consequence of neuron firings, or in psychological terms 
as a consequence of thirst. It is more than interesting that 
in his opinion such different causal explanations do not 
exclude each other but are, since they represent robust 
patterns of counterfactual dependence at different onto-
logical levels, compatible. 
The three ideas combined give us a picture of causation 
according to which the same phenomena can be parts of 
different patterns of counterfactual dependence; they 
appear at different ontological levels and it is the context 
that determines which of them is the most appropriate for 
the causal explanation. But sometimes the same phe-
nomenon can be described in terms of different ontological 
levels producing different causal explanations that do not 
exclude each other. Their compatibility in Horgan’s opinon 
originates in supervenient relations presumably holding 
among different ontological levels. According to them 
psychological patterns depend on lower located physical 
patterns. He writes: “/…/ the mental properties that are 
causal properties at the psychological level have their 
causal efficacy via the causal efficacy of physical causal 
properties [that are causal properties at the physical level] 
that realize them.” (Horgan 2001) Therefore causal powers 




of mental properties are not over and above causal powers 
of physical properties, and this is why the causal closure of 
the physical domain is not violated. 
Horgan’s solution of mental causation could be illus-
trated by the following diagram (suppose again that my 
desire for water M causes drinking; note that PCD stands 
for the pattern of counterfactual dependence):  
psychological explanation  
M   since there is a PCD saying that  
desires → actions,  





(since there is a PCD saying that  
firings of neurons → muscle contrac-
tions, and  
P   because we have chosen a  
neurophysiological vocabulary)  
physical explanation  
(The broken arrow denotes a relation of supervenience; 
the solid arrows designate a relation of causation.) 
This looks very much like a case of causal overdetermi-
nation but Horgan denies this by saying that it is true that 
“given the specific level of description that is contextually 
appropriate for causal explanation, several properties are 
co-instantiated, all at the relevant level of description, each 
of which is such that its instantiation is independently 
causally sufficient (in the circumstances) for the effect.” 
(Horgan 2001) But since causal overdetermination is 
something that arises when two causes appear at the 
same time at the same level mental, properties and their 
realizers occurring in different patterns of counterfactual 
dependence holding at different ontological levels do not 
face this problem.  
It seems that such a solution of mental causation, called 
causal compatibilism, secures the mental a causal status. 
It supposes the existence of real causation at different 
ontological levels and says that despite the causal closure 
principle, causal explanations of the physical level are not 
incompatible with causal explanations of the psychological 
level.  
2. Objection to Horgan’s Causal Compati-
bilism 
Does Horgan's answer really avoid the dilemma posed 
by Kim? Fortunately, Horgan does not underestimate 
metaphysics, as some philosophers suggest; on the 
contrary, he believes that the compatibility of causal 
explanations at different levels rests on supervenience. 
However, the idea that supervenience can secure the 
mental the causal efficacy via the physical without the 
worry of causal overdetermination turns out to be highly 
problematic and makes his answer controversial. Why? 
Horgan says that mental properties are causally effica-
cious via physical properties and therefore there is no 
danger that the mental, while causing the physical, violates 
the causal closure principle. But isn’t this something that 
the supervenient model of causation supposes in the first 
place in order to be a real non-reductivist alternative to 
other solutions? Of course. The supervenient model of 
causation claims that a mental property (M) supervenes on 
a physical property (P) and that, for example, drinking 
supervenes on a muscle contraction; it further says that M 
causes drinking via P, which causes the relevant muscle 
contraction, and that this is enough to avoid a violation of 
the causal closure principle. But Horgan is aware that this 
is nothing new and that the real challenge is yet to come, 
namely, how to deal with the problems accompanying the 
supervenient model of causation: a critique that even on 
this model we must still deal with two different and suffi-
cient causes of drinking, M and P. This makes the claim 
that the supervenient model of causation avoids the 
violation of the causal closure of the physics highly 
doubtful.  
However, Horgan thinks that we can very well avoid 
causal overdetermination; his line of thought is repre-
sented by the following passage: “i.e., even after we 
contextually fix the operative score in the causal-explan-
ation game in a way that restricts the relevant patterns of 
counterfactual dependence to those involving properties at 
a specific level in the hierarchy of the sciences, we still find 
several properties instantiated that each figure in the 
contextually relevant dependence patterns in a way that 
makes each property-instantiation an independently 
causally sufficient condition for the effect.” (Horgan 2001) 
Again, the reason that we do not end up with causal over-
determination is, in his opinion, the fact that mental 
properties and their physical realizers appear in different 
patterns of counterfactual dependence at different onto-
logical levels, whereas causal overdetermination always 
emerges when two causes occur at the same time, at the 
same level. 
And why is this problematic? Well, one might say that 
Horgan’s belief about the compatibility of such different 
causal explanations involving different causes, which rests 
on supervenient relations that presumably hold among 
properties of different levels, is simply false. This appeals 
thereby to Kim’s distinction between microproperties and 
micro-based properties proving that supervenience is a 
relation that holds among properties of the same level and 
not among properties of different levels. But before we get 
to his idea, something else must be said. It is widely 
accepted that physical realization involves a claim which 
says that macro or second-order properties (a macro-
property is for example a colour) are realized by first-order 
or microproperties (a microproperty is for example a 
spinning of quarks). Morevoer, the understanding of the 
notion of a second-order property, to which we usually 
appeal states the following: “For something to have a 
second-order property is for it to have one or another of its 
realizers, that is, a first-order property satisfying the speci-
fication that defines the second-order property.” (Kim 
2001)  
But this is bad news for Horgan since according to this 
we have, when going to the kitchen to get a glass of water, 
both properties: we are thirsty and the neurons that realize 
our thirst are firing. It seems that in the layered model of 
the world a second-order property and its realizer appear 
at the same level and that they are properties of the same 
object. Therefore, while speaking about second-order 
properties and their realizers we do not move either 
upward or downward but always stay at the same level. 
Kim says: “In general, supervenient properties and their 
base properties are instantiated by the same objects and 
hence are on the same level« and he continues »so 
microphysical, or mereological, supervenience does not 
track the micro-macro hierarchy.” (Kim 2001)  




The reason for the mistaken belief that higher-order 
properties supervene on microproperties, which may make 
us think that supervenience is a relation among properties 
of different levels, lies in a too strict understanding of 
supervenience. We become confused because realizers 
are usually described in terms of their microstructure, 
which leads us to the false belief that they are microprop-
erties appearing at lower levels. But in fact realizers belong 
to higher levels, merely their description is different from 
those of other higher-order properties, and therefore also 
represent macroproperties. Transparancy, for instance, is 
a macroproperty which can be realized only by molecules 
having the right combination of atoms, i.e. water. But its 
realizer is, despite being described as H2O, a macro-
property, or at best micro-based property, since it is a 
group of atoms that have a property being transparent only 
if formed in this special way.  
We could speak about real microproperties realizing 
macroproperties and about changing levels only if trans-
parancy were realized by its single atoms, or going even 
lower, by parts constituting them. But this can’t happen 
since transparancy is a property that can be realized only 
by molecules with the right structure. It is a feature of 
molecules and not atoms or quarks and it can appear only 
at the molecular level, which makes it impossible for its 
realizer to belong to any other level but the molecular one. 
So, when we say that Peter’s desire (M) supervenes on his 
microphysical properties (P) we think only of its depend-
ence on his micro-based properties (not microproperties) 
and relations holding among them. P on which M super-
venes is therefore “the property of having such-and-such 
proper parts that have such-and-such properties and are 
configurated by such-and-such relations.” (Kim 2001) The 
property that they have as a whole, e.g. to be P, does not 
belong to any of its parts, just like the property that two 
atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen have as a 
whole, e.g. to be H2O, does not belong to any of its single 
atoms. 
Supervenience is therefore a relation that holds at the 
same level and since causal overdetermination also 
emerges at the same level it looks like we are only a step 
away from excluding the mental from causal explanations. 
The dilemma that Horgan faces now arguing for causal 
compatibilism is the following: either keep claiming that the 
compatibility of different causal explanations rests on 
supervenient relations that hold among them, which leads 
to causal overdetermination; or give up supervenient 
relations as something that can secure such compatibility 
and thereby risk having no metaphysical ground on which 
to base his solution of mental causation, regardless that 
this seems to be necessary for it. In the standard form, the 
dilemma could be written as follows:  
(1)  Either we accept supervenience as a relation  
 securing the compatibility of different causal ex-
planations or we give it up. 
(2)  If we accept it we end up with the causal exclus-
ion of the mental (since supervenience as well 
as causal overdetermination are features of the 
same level supervenience can’t make different 
causal explanations compatible with each other).  
(3)  If we give it up we threaten our physicalistic view 
(because we do not meet a required condition for 
physicalism). 
∴ (4)  Either we end up with the causal exclusion of the 
mental or threaten our physicalistic view.  
Since none of the horns is acceptable for the antireduc-
tionist like Horgan we might conclude that his solution of 
mental causation which supposes the compatibility of 
different causal explanations of the same phenomenon on 
the basis of supervenient relations holding among proper-
ties of different levels, does not represent a real non-
reductive alternative, which leaves Kim’s causal dilemma, 
at least from the antireductionist point of view, still un-
solved.  
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